

Who, if anyone, will supersede the United States of America as hegemon of the interstate capitalist system? How will the world's most powerful nations reconcile the requirements of profit and growth, on the one hand, and their citizens' demands for democratic participation, on the other? When will the finitude of the world's resources and the instability produced by climate change render the obligation for continual economic growth unfeasible? Will innovations in environmental technologies stymie capitalist growth or bestow industry with improved conditions of profitability? How will calls for sovereignty and national identity be resolved with increasingly transnational flows of goods and services? Will the increased demands and militancy of the Chinese working class challenge the working conditions that have thus far bolstered global growth rates? How will rising dissatisfaction with tax avoidance be reconciled with reliance on financialized corporations whose obligations to shareholders remain to minimize tax expenditure? How will workers positioned at the bottom of global supply chains respond to their continued maltreatment, and how will their dissatisfaction be registered in core economies? How will popular demands for full employment be reconciled with the capitalist desideratum of a mobile workforce, vulnerable to their future financial obligations? When will states, governments, households, and firms registered in core long-term requirement to reproduce a regular supply of labour power? Will the US dollar relinquish its status as international reserve currency and rising replace it? Will declining growth, sharpening inequality and rising economic crises? Will sharpening inequalities give rise to political movements that grant concessions to the struggle for the property of the capitalist enterprise? Will the intensification of the struggle for the property of the capitalist enterprise be a

T J Watson 15.12.2016

The camouflage-white desk and its attendant A4 literature constitute rarely discussed ubiquities of commercial art. Upon entry to the private gallery, spectators customarily visit such desks to obtain a list of works and press release; the information there detailed is often thought vital to enlightened interpretation. Whether through habit or choice, however, the process itself is seldom considered discussion-worthy, its forms and relations neatly and commonsensically distinguished from any task of artistic understanding. Thus, the demands placed on the gallery desk – assumed by both viewer and seller of art – have been of discretion and invisibility. A table and press release ought not to announce themselves lest they wish to announce the site of relation, or non-relation, between art and its contingent non-art practices.

Accordingly, only subtle variations differentiate private gallery desks. Typically, more financially successful galleries construct desks from plastic, while fledgling commercial galleries opt for wood. To the uninterested eye, most appear alike: white, geometric and approximately four feet tall (a size both standard for the width of sheet material and sufficient to obscure a seated worker). Employees of the gallery engage in administrative labour behind, undertaking the logistics required of exhibition and commerce.

Traditionally, the furniture's obfuscations and art world ordinariness have been prerequisites for the autonomy of work displayed; the desk and press release occupy a position constructed between singularity, or exceptionality, and doxa. Together, the two are curious pieces of ritualised non-art that, like the commodity form, pervade the reception of art without announcing their intrusion. The spatiality of the two, though, remains differently received: the desk is commonly posited in measurable, architectural space, while the press release, as text, is beheld in a monadic, self-contained space.

Viewers acquainted with London's commercial galleries will recognise aspects of the works enclosed. The works proffer attempted facsimiles of the front of three blue-chip gallery desks: *Hauser and Wirth*, Savile Row; *Sadie Coles*, Kingly Street; and *Marian Goodman*, Lower John Street. Made as facades, the objects have been further trimmed to a near-uniform length of roughly 150cm, atop which sit 30 copies of an A4 text formatted in accordance with each gallery's preferred layout. The text, in place of a press release, is new.

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Untitled (Hauser and Wirth)

Wood, paint, paper
120 x 175 x 120cm
2016



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
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Untitled (Sadie Coles)

Wood, paint, paper
120 x 160 x 110cm
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Untitled (Marian Goodman)

Wood, paint, perspex, paper
120 x 160 x 110cm
2016

